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Abstract
Following the seminal contribution of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997),
the role of collateral constraints for business cycle uctuations has
been highlighted by several authors and collateralized debt is becom-
ing a popular feature of business cycle models. In contrast, Kocher-
lakota (2000) and Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) demonstrate that collat-
eral constraints per se are unable to propagate and amplify exogenous
shocks, unless unorthodox assumptions on preferences and production
technologies are made. The aim of this paper is to examine the con-
tribution of costly debt enforcement procedures in the amplication
of business cycle uctuations through collateral constraints. We show
that for realistic degrees of ine¢ ciency, collateral constraints can sig-
nicantly amplify the e¤ects of productivity shocks on output even
under standard assumptions on preferences and technology.
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1 Introduction
Standard Real Business Cycle theories succeed in accounting for business
cycle observations of aggregate quantities, such as output, investment and
consumption, by relying mainly on large and persistent aggregate produc-
tivity shocks. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Kiyotaki (1998) show that if
debt is fully secured by collateral, even small and temporary productivity
shocks can have large and persistent e¤ects on economic activity. They doc-
ument that the credit system may act as a powerful mechanism by which
small shocks propagate into the economy. Kiyotaki and Moores theoreti-
cal work has been very inuential and an increasing number of papers have
documented the contribution of collateralized debt to business cycle uctua-
tions. For example, on the international transmission of business cycles, see
Iacoviello and Minetti (2007); on the role of the housing and collateralized
debt in the transmission and amplication of shocks, see Iacoviello (2005)
and Iacoviello and Neri (2008); on the macroeconomic implications of mort-
gage market deregulation, see Campbell and Hercowitz (2005); on the role of
nominal debt in sudden stops, see Mendoza (2006) and Mendoza and Smith
(2007); and on over borrowing, see Uribe (2007). A common assumption in
this strand of the business cycle literature is that a certain degree of debt
enforcement ine¢ ciency in the credit market limits the agentsdebt to be a
fraction of the value of their collateral.
Collateralized debt is becoming a popular feature of business cycle mod-
els, despite the fact that Kocherlakota (2000) and Cordoba and Ripoll (2004)
demonstrated that collateral constraints per se are unable to propagate and
amplify exogenous shocks, unless unorthodox assumptions on preferences
and production technologies are made. However, papers on the ampli-
cation role of collateral constraints have neglected the role of ine¢ ciencies
in the liquidation of the collateralized assets. As documented by Djankov,
Hart, McLiesh and Shleifer (2006), debt enforcement procedures around the
world are signicantly ine¢ cient. They study debt enforcement with re-
spect to an insolvent rm, documenting the time required to resolve the
insolvency and the cost of the insolvency process, to assess the degree of
e¢ ciency of debt enforcement in 88 countries. They nd that all procedures
are extremely time consuming, costly, and ine¢ cient and that the degree of
ine¢ ciency varies enormously between countries. According to their nd-
ings, an average of 48 percent of the rms value is lost in debt enforcement
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worldwide.1 Table 1 summarizes their results.2
This paper aims to reconcile these two strands of the business cycle
literature by exploring the role of costly debt enforcement procedures in the
amplication of productivity shocks. We limit our analysis to the class of
models with inelastic capital supply and borrowing limits à la Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997). We document that the magnitude of amplication depends
substantially on the degree of debt enforcement e¢ ciency assumed in the
credit market. As a result, collateral constraints signicantly amplify the
e¤ects of productivity shocks on output even under standard assumptions
on preferences and technology.
The key insight is that the degree of ine¢ ciency in the debt enforcement
procedure a¤ects the sensitivity of output to shocks through the redistrib-
ution of capital between borrowers and lenders. The intuition is as follows.
The amount of capital that borrowers can hold is limited by the existence
of credit constraints. Thus, compared to an economy without colateral con-
traints, the allocation of capital between borrowers and lenders turns out to
be ine¢ cient and total production is distorted below the frictionless level.
Given the fact that all producers face the same technology, borrowers
experience higher marginal productivity of capital. A redistribution of cap-
ital between the two groups of agents thus generates signicant variations
in total production. For example, a positive productivity shock, by relax-
ing those borrowing constraints that initially limited capital holdings among
borrowers, allows for a more e¢ cient allocation of capital between agents.
An increase in the share of capital held by borrowers, who have higher mar-
ginal productivity, amplies the e¤ect of the shock on output. The degree of
debt enforcement ine¢ ciency determines the di¤erence in marginal produc-
tivity between borrowers and lenders and thus the size of the endogenous
amplication generated by the model. The sensitivity of output to produc-
tivity shocks varies in a non-linear way with respect to the degree of credit
market ine¢ ciency.
The model features negligible amplication in only two parameteriza-
tions: autarky and fully e¢ cient debt enforcement procedures. In the ab-
sence of a credit market, capital is allocated in a very ine¢ cient way, so the
1E¢ ciency is dened in relation to the present value of the terminal value of the rm
after bankruptcy costs.
2 In the left column we report the measure of e¢ ciency by income group. The right
column shows data on debt enforcement for a subsample OECD countries by legal origins.
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gains from a better allocation of resources are potentially very big. However,
the redistribution of capital induced by the shock itself is limited since im-
patient agents can nance their capital expenditure only through their own
income. Thus, the share of borrowers capital increases by little and the
amplication of the shocks on total output is negligible. On the other hand,
under fully e¢ cient debt enforcement procedures, the allocation of capital
between borrowers and lenders is already very close to the frictionless level.
Thus, the changes in total output following on the redistribution of capital
are minimal and the amplication generated by the model is negligible.
This paper improves upon previous literature by documenting the contri-
bution of ine¢ ciency in the debt enforcement procedure to the amplication
of business cycle uctuations which other authors have not considered. We
document that Kocherlakota (2000) and Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) results
are not robust to di¤erent assumptions on the degree of ine¢ ciencies. In
fact, for realistic degrees of credit market ine¢ ciency, collateral constraints
signicantly amplify the e¤ects of productivity shocks on output even under
standard assumptions on preferences and technology.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the benchmark
model and section 3 studies the models dynamics. Section 4 discusses how
the models endogenous amplication relates to measures of the e¢ ciency
of the debt enforcement procedure observed in the U.S. Section 5 presents
some extensions of the model. Section 6 draws some conclusions.
2 Benchmark Model
Model 1. Following Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), we consider a discrete time
economy populated by two types of agents who trade two kinds of goods: a
durable asset and a non-durable commodity. The durable asset (k) does not
depreciate and has a xed supply normalized to one. The commodity good
(c) is produced with the durable asset and cannot be stored. At time t there
are two competitive markets in the economy: the asset market, in which one
unit of the durable asset can be exchanged for qt units of the consumption
good, and the credit market. The economy is populated by a continuum
of ex-ante heterogeneous agents of unit mass: n1 Patient Entrepreneurs
(denoted by 1) and n2 Impatient Entrepreneurs (denoted by 2). In order to
impose the existence of ows of credit in this economy we assume ex-ante
heterogeneity based on di¤erent subjective discount factors: 2 < 1 < 1:
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This assumption ensures that in equilibrium patient households lend and
impatient households borrow.
Both agents produce the commodity good using the same technology:
yit = Ztk

it 1; (1)
where Zt represents an aggregate technology shock. We assume that agents
have access to the same concave production technology: 1 = 2 < 1: How-
ever, following previous literature, technology is specic to each producer
and only the household that started the production process has the skills
necessary to complete the process. Nevertheless, agents cannot precommit
to produce. This means that if household i decides not to put his e¤ort into
production between t and t+1, there would be no output at t+1, but only
the asset kit. Agent are free to walk away from the production process and
from debt contracts between t and t+ 1. This results in a default problem
that makes creditors willing to protect themselves by collateralizing the bor-
rowers asset. Creditors know that in the case where the borrower chooses
not to produce and neglects his debt obligations, they can still get his asset.
However, we assume that the lenders can repossess the borrowers assets
only after paying a proportional transaction cost, [(1  )Etqt+1kit]. Thus,
agents cannot borrow more than a certain amount such that the next pe-
riods repayment obligation cannot exceed the expected value of next period
assets:
bit  Et [qt+1kit] ; (2)
where (1  ) is the cost lenders must pay to repossess the collateral asset.
The lower ; the more costly, and thus ine¢ cient, the debt enforcement
procedure.
Agents face the following problem:
max
fcit;kit;bitg
E0
P1
t=0 (i)
t U (cit) i = 1; 2
s:t:
cit + qt(kit   kit 1) = yit + bitRt   bit 1
yit = Ztk

it 1
bit  Et [qt+1kit] ;
where kit is a durable asset, cit; a consumption good, and bit; the debt level.
Agentsoptimal choices of bonds and capital are characterized by:
Uci;t
Rt
 iEtUci;t+1 (3)
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and
qt   iEt
Uci;t+1
Uci;t
qt+1  iEt
Uci;t+1
Uci;t
(Fki;t+1) ; (4)
where Fki;t = Ztk
 1
it 1 is the marginal product of capital. Households fea-
ture a concave utility function U(cit) =
c1 it
1   . The rst equation relates the
marginal benet of borrowing to its marginal cost. For constrained agents,
the marginal benet is always bigger than the marginal cost of borrowing.
If i;t  0 is the multiplier associated with the borrowing constraint, then
the Euler equation becomes:
Uci;t
Rt
  i;t = iEtUci;t+1 : (3.a)
The second equation states that the opportunity cost of holding one unit of
capital,
h
qt   iEt
Uci;t+1
Uci;t
qt+1
i
, is bigger or equal to the expected discounted
marginal product of capital. For constrained agents the marginal benet of
holding one unit of capital is given not only by its marginal product but also
by the marginal benet of being allowed to borrow more:
qt   2Et
Uc2;t+1
Uc2;t
qt+1 = 2Et
Uc2;t+1
Uc2;t
(Fk2;t+1) + Etqt+1
t
Uc2;t
: (4.a)
Collateral constraints alter the future revenue from an additional unit of
capital for the borrowers. Holding an extra unit of capital relaxes the credit
constraint and thus increases their shadow price of capital. This additional
return encourages borrowers to accumulate capital even though they dis-
count their revenues more heavily than lenders.
In the deterministic steady state, the group of impatient households is
credit constrained.3 Following previous literature, we analyze the properties
3Consider the Euler equation of the impatient household:
uc2;t
Rt
  2;t = 2Etuc2;t+1 :
In the steady state it implies:
2 =

1
R
  2

uc2 :
Since the steady state interest rate is determined by the discount factor of the patient
agent:
2 =

1
R
  2

uc2 = (1   2)uc2 ;
As long as 2 < 1 < 1, the lagrange multiplier associated with the borrowing constraint
for the impatient household is strictly positive in the deterministic steady state.
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of the model in a neighborhood of the steady state, in which impatient
households borrow up to the maximum:
b2;t = Et [qt+1k2t]
and
k2t =
W2;t   c2;th
qt   Et qt+1Rt
i ;
where W2;t = y2;t + qtk2;t   b2;t 1 is the impatient agents wealth at the be-
ginning of time t, and dt =
h
qt   Et qt+1Rt
i
represents the di¤erence between
the price of capital and the amount he can borrow against a unit of capi-
tal, i.e. the downpayment required to buy a unit of capital. The creditors
capital decision is determined at the point where the opportunity cost of
holding capital equals its marginal product:
qt   1Et
Uc1;t+1
Uc1;t
qt+1 = 1Et
Uc1;t+1
Uc1;t
(Fk1;t+1) : (3.b)
The total stock of capital kt is given by:
kt = (1  n)k1t + nk2t: (5)
3 Results
Benchmark parameter values. As a benchmark case, we set the para-
metersvalue on a quarterly base as in table 2. Patient householdsdiscount
factor equals 0.99 such that the average annual rate of return is about 4 per-
cent. The discount factor for impatient agents, 2, equals 0.95 This value
is in line with previous estimates by Lawrence (1991), Samwick (1998) and
Warner and Pleeter (2001). See also Hendricks (2007). The baseline choice
for the fraction of the population that is borrowing constrained, n2; is set
to 50 percent. This value is also in the range of estimates in the literature.
Campbell and Mankiw (1989) estimate around 40 percent of the population
to be rule-of-thumb consumers. According to Iacoviello (2005), in the U.S.
about 55 percent of the population is credit constrained. The coe¢ cient of
relative risk aversion, ; equals 2.2, which is in the range suggested by sev-
eral previous authors. Since it is di¢ cult to pin down the share of capital in
production, we use a pragmatic approach. As a benchmark value, we begin
by setting =0.4. In the next section we investigate the sensitivity of our
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results to di¤erent parameter values and to the introduction of labor as an
input of production.
A look at the steady state. In what follows, we analyze how the
deterministic steady state of the model is a¤ected by the degree of e¢ ciency
in the debt enforcement procedure, as proxied by . Figure 1.a shows the
marginal productivity of capital, and thus the e¢ ciency of production, as
a function of . Since in the deterministic steady state the group of impa-
tient households is credit constrained, their capital holding is less than the
level that maximizes total output.4 Ceteris paribus, a higher  improves
the allocation of capital between the two groups of agents and reduces the
di¤erence between borrowersand lendersmarginal productivity. Using the
equations representing the householdsoptimal choice of capital evaluated
at the steady state it is possible to show that as long as  < 11 ;
Fk2
Fk1
=
1 [1  2   (1   2)]
(1  1)2
> 1; (6)
where Fki = 

Ki
ni
 1
: The steady state allocation of capital depends on
the subjective discount factors, the population weights for the two groups
of agents, and the degree of credit market ine¢ ciency, :
K2 =
1
1 + n1n2
h
2(1 1)
1[1 2 (1 2)]
i 1
 1
 : (7)
Compared to the frictionless case, the allocation under credit constraints
reduces the level of capital held by borrowers and implies a di¤erence in
the marginal productivity of capital for the two groups of producers. Thus,
total production is distorted below the e¢ cient level. More e¢ cient debt
enforcement procedures reduce the e¢ ciency loss in terms of output. In
fact, a more e¢ cient credit market implies credit expansion and thus a rise
in the level of capital held by borrowers (gure 1.b).5 A better allocation of
capital between the two groups leads to an increase in total production.
4The e¢ cient allocation of capital between the two groups would be given by equality
between the marginal products of the two groups:
Fk1;t = Fk2;t:
Thus, given the aggregate condition on capital and since the total population is normalized
to be equal to the unit interval, each group of agents would get the same amount of capital
in the deterministic steady state.
5The price of the collateral asset is also higher. In the steady state, the asset prices
depend on the marginal productivity of capital. More specically, the householdsoptimal
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Impulse Responses. We now consider the response of the model econ-
omy to a productivity shock when =1.6 Aggregate production follows an
AR(1) process given by
ln(Zt) = Z ln(Zt 1) + "Zt; "Zt viid N(0; );
with Z = 0:9: We assume that the economy is at the steady state level at
time zero and then is hit by an unexpected decrease in aggregate produc-
tivity of 1 percent. The results are reported in gure 2.a. An aggregate
negative shock reduces production and thus the earnings of both groups of
agents. Since the shock is temporary, borrowers sell a part of their capital
stock to smooth the e¤ect of the shock on consumption. Given the assump-
tion of inelastic supply of capital, in order for the capital market to clear,
lenders have to increase their demand for capital. The user cost of hold-
ing capital decreases. Movements in the relative price of capital, altering
the value of the collateral asset, a¤ect the ability to borrow and, in turn,
borrowersexpenditure decisions. Thus, constrained agents are negatively
a¤ected not only by the direct impact of the shock but also by the reduced
availability of credit resulting from a reduction in the value of their col-
lateral. Via the reduction in borrowers current investment expenditures,
the shock impacts total production over time due to the higher marginal
productivity of capital. However, the response of total output displayed in
gure 2.b shows that when =1 and standard parameter values are used to
calibrate the technology and utility functions, the amplication generated
by the model is negligible. This result is in accordance with Cordoba and
Ripoll (2004).
Amplication and Persistence. How does the e¢ ciency of the debt
enforcement procedure a¤ect the amplication of shocks to output? Since
the rst impact of the shock would always be equal to the shock itself, we
look at the second-period e¤ect of the shock. Figure 3.a plots the percent-
age deviation of output attributed to the models endogenous propagation
choice of capital gives
q =
1
1  1
Fk1 :
6 In order to limit concerns on the occassionally binding nature of the borrowing con-
straint, we base our analysis on the e¤ects of negative productivity shocks. We condition
on the initial state of the economy being the deterministic steady state and assume that the
economy is hit by an unexpected reduction in productivity. Thus, the lagrange multiplier
associated with the collateral constraints is always positive. As a result, the borrowing
constraint always binds.
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mechanism  i.e. the second-period variation in output that exceeds the
exogenous impact on output directly implied by the autocorrelation of the
shock. The sensitivity of output to productivity shocks varies in a non-linear
way with respect to the degree of credit market ine¢ ciency, and it is up to 30
percent stronger than that obtained with a fully e¢ cient debt enforcement
procedure (=1).
Under credit constraints, borrowers capital holding is below the fric-
tionless level. Given that all producers face the same technology, borrowers
experience higher marginal productivity of capital. A redistribution of capi-
tal between the two groups of agents generates signicant variations in terms
of total production. In the absence of a credit market, capital is allocated
in a very ine¢ cient way, so the gains from a better allocation of resources
are potentially very big (see gure 1.a). On the other hand, the redistribu-
tion of capital induced by the shock itself is limited since impatient agents
cannot nance their capital expenditure through the credit market. Thus,
the amplication of the shocks on total production is negligible. A more
e¢ cient the credit market allow for a larger the redistribution of capital,
enhancing the endogenous amplication generated by the model. However,
as  rises the di¤erence in marginal productivity of capital between lenders
and borrowers is smaller (see gures 1.a, 1.c), which reduces the sensitivity
of total output to shocks. Under fully e¢ cient debt enforcement procedures
the model feature negligible amplication. In this last case, the allocation
of capital between borrowers and lenders is already very close to the fric-
tionless level. Thus, the gains or losses in terms of aggregate production
coming from the redistribution of capital are minimal and the amplication
generated by the model is in fact negligible.7
Strictly speaking, the second-period elasticity of total output with re-
spect to technology shocks can be written as:
yz = yk2k2z =
Fk2   Fk1
Fk2

y2
y
k2z: (8)
7Kiyotaki and Moores (1997) theoretical work shows that the amplication generated
by the model can be potentially very large. They assume  = 1: Under their assumption
of a linear production function for impatient agents, the relative di¤erence in the marginal
productivity of capital is quite large, and total production is far from the e¢ cient level even
when  = 1. Thus, the redistribution of capital between borrowers and lenders enhances
the response of total production to shocks even in the presence of a fully e¢ cient credit
market. Their assumption of a linear production technology has been criticized by Cordoba
and Ripoll (2004), who document that when agents face concave production functions no
amplication is endogenously generated by the model.
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The rst term is the productivity gap between constrained and uncon-
strained agents (see gure 1.a),  represents the share of capital in pro-
duction, while y2y is the production share of constrained agents, and k2z is
the elasticity of borrowerscapital with respect to the shock (i.e. the redis-
tribution of capital to impatient agents). In order to explain the non-linear
relationship between the impact of the shock on output and the degree of
credit friction, we rst focus on the redistribution of capital between the two
groups of agents (k2z). The right panel of gure 3.b shows the reaction of
borrowerscapital expenditure when the shock hits the economy. The im-
pact of the shock on capital expenditure displays an inverted-U relationship
with the degree of ine¢ ciency in the debt enforcement procedures.
The downpayment that is, the di¤erence between the price of capital
and the amount agents can borrow against a unit of capital represents the
amount required to buy a unit of capital:
DP^t =
qss
DPss
q^t    qss
Rss
h
q^t+1   R^t
i
:
The reactions of the borrowerscapital expenditures and the downpayment
are symmetrically opposite (gure 3.c). The stronger the e¤ect of the shock
on downpayment, the weaker the reaction of capital. The shape of the rela-
tionship between the degree of ine¢ ciency in the credit market and the e¤ect
on downpayment can be explained by the existence of two opposite forces
determining the intensity of the downpayment reaction. Higher  implies a
smaller productivity gap and thus a weaker the reaction of qt and, in turn,
DPt itself to the shock. The decrease in the downpayment is thus lower
than would otherwise be, leaving capital more expensive and borrowers
capital expenditure further reduced. At the same time, a more pronounced
reduction in the demand for loanable funds causes a more dramatic fall in
the real interest rate, Rt; which implies a more sizeable reduction in the
downpayment and thus a less pronounced decline in k2t. The sensitivity of
borrowerscapital expenditures to a productivity shock depends on which
of the two opposite e¤ects prevails. Non-linearity in the redistribution of
capital between the two groups of agents contributes to non-linearity in the
sensitivity of output to productivity shocks.
Nevertheless, the elasticity of output to zt maintains an inverted-U shape,
independent of the non-linearity in k2z: Assume that lendersutility func-
tion is linear in consumption, so that the interest rate is constant over the
business cycle. Now the dynamics of the downpayment depend only on qt:
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The higher the level of ; the weaker the e¤ect on the downpayment and
thus the larger the impact of the shock on capital. However, the relation-
ship between  and the second-period impact of zt on yt still has an inverted
U-shape (gure 3.d). As shown by equation (8), the elasticity of total out-
put to productivity shocks depends on the production share of constrained
agents and the productivity gap. The fraction of total output produced by
constrained agents increases with ; since more e¢ cient enforcement proce-
dures induce a better allocation of capital in the economy (production share
e¤ect). However, for the same reason, the productivity gap decreases with .
See gures 1.a and 1.c. Thus, regardless of the shape of the capital reaction
to technology shocks, the second-period impact of the shock on total output
has a non-linear shape. However, the non-linearity in yz is enhanced by the
inverted U-shape of k2z.
4 Quantitative Results
Results presented above show that for values of  below unity the model
with collateral constraints can generate amplication and persistence of pro-
ductivity shocks of non-negligible magnitude. However, the relation being
hump-shaped, the magnitude of amplication varies signicantly. In what
follows we investigate the quantitative relevance of the amplication gen-
erated by the model when the e¢ ciency in the debt market is set to the
level reported for the US (0.858). Under the benchmark calibration, the
amplication on output is about 24 percent.
We now investigate the sensitivity of the results to the share of capital
in production and the discount factor of borrowers. Regarding the discount
factor of borrowers, we compare the results for three di¤erent values of 2:
0.91, 0.95 and 0.97. These values are in the ballpark of previous estimates.
For the share of capital in the production process, , we follow Angele-
tos and Calvet (2006) and assume two di¤erent values of this parameter:
=0.4; which corresponds to the standard denition of capital, and =0.7,
which reects a broader denition and includes both physical and intangible
capital.
Table 3.a shows that when the degree of e¢ ciency in the debt market
equals that reported for the US, the amplication endogenously generated
by the model is quantitatively signicant. The degree of endogenous ampli-
cation generated by the model can be as low as 19 percent (2=0.97, =0.4)
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and as high as 39 percent (2=0.95, =0.7). In any case, the magnitude of
amplication is sizable and signicantly higher than what we observe in the
version of the model where ine¢ ciencies in the liquidation of the collateral-
ized asset are neglected (=1). As a result, for realistic degrees of e¢ ciency
in the debt enforcement procedures, collateral constraints can signicantly
amplify the e¤ects of productivity shocks on output even under standard
assumptions on preferences and technology.
It is not surprising that a lower discount factor for impatient agents is
associated with more sizable endogenous amplication. A lower 2 implies
a higher degree of heterogeneity in the model, a wider productivity gap
between borrowers and lenders (see eq.6), and thus greater amplication.
The role of capital intensity in production in generating amplication is such
that for 2 = 0:91; =0.4 amplies the e¤ect of the shock to a greater extent.
However, when the gap in discount factors shrinks, stronger amplication is
given by =0.7 (see gure 4). The relation between  and the intensity of the
output reaction to productivity shocks is clearly non-linear with respect to :
In contrast to Kocherlakota (2000), we document that output amplication
is not a strictly increasing function of the capital share. In fact, a lower
 does not necessarily imply lower amplication of shocks. In the model
presented here, this result holds only for a low degree of heterogeneity or a
high degree of ine¢ ciency in the debt enforcement procedures.
5 Extension of the Model: Introducing Labour
Supply
According to Cordoba and Ripoll (2004), if aggregate labor is not xed but
rather optimally supplied, the amplication role of collateral constraints is
dramatically reduced. To explore the robustness of the results presented
above, we now consider the case where household work is also an input of
production. We assume that each household works in its own rm and gets
utility from leisure.
Model 2. Following Greenwood et al. (1988), we adopt the following
utility function
U(cit; Lit) =
1
1 

cit   L

it

1 
(9)
and production function
yit = Ztk

it 1L
1 
it : (10)
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Endogenous amplication of the shocks is already present in the rst pe-
riod.8 In response to a 1 percent decrease in productivity, total output
decreases by 1.47 percent. However, it is possible to show that the rst pe-
riod amplication is independent of . Given the households labor supply,
L 1it = (1  )ZtkitL it ; (11)
individuals production can be written in terms of the capital input:
yit = Z

+ 1
t k
+
(1 )
+ 1
it 1
1  

:
When productivity decreases by 1 percent, output decreases by + 1 =
1:47 percent. As gure 5.a shows, ceteris paribus, di¤erent degrees of inef-
ciency in the credit market imply di¤erent magnitudes of the endogenous
amplication of output in response to the same shock. The second impact
still varies with the degree of credit friction. The elasticity of total output
with respect to technology shocks can be written as in equation (8), but now
multiplied by + 1 :
yz =

+    1yk2k2z: (12)
Figure 5.a shows that the output response delivered by the model with
collateral constraints can be much stronger and persistent than the response
generated by the representative agent model. In this latter framework, the
economy is populated only by patient agents and there are no limits to
credit. In the model with collateralized debt, the reaction of output to
a productivity shock is between 50 percent and 130 percent higher than
the variation directly induced by the shock. So, despite the non-linearity
featured by the model, a degree of amplication signicantly higher than
that generated by the representative agent model is displayed.
Model 3. In order to take into account the implications for ampli-
cation of the wealth e¤ects on labor supply the following utility function is
assumed9:
U(cit; Lit) =
1
1 

c
(1 ')
it (1  Lit)'
1 
: (13)
8We calibrate the labor supply elasticity to 0.5 (=2). The weight on leisure is chosen
so that hours worked in the initial steady state is around 1/3 of total time depending on
 (=1).
9We calibrate ' = 0:6; so that hours worked in the initial steady state are around 1/3
of total time.
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As in Cordoba and Ripoll (2004), when  = 1; introducing labor supply
according to a utility function of this type is detrimental for the amplication
of shocks. However, the result only holds for a very limited range of the debt
enforcement procedure parameter. Figure 5.b shows that for any value of
 < 0:98; the magnitude of the second-period amplication is bigger than
that produced by the equivalent representative agent model.10 Below this
value, output responds between 5 percent and 25 percent more than the
reaction directly induced by the variation in productivity.
Tables 3.b compares di¤erent versions of the model under the benchmark
parameter values. First we document that, in accordance with previous lit-
erature, if we do not take into account ine¢ ciency in the debt enforcement
process (=1), di¤erent versions of the model predict either negligible am-
plication of productivity shocks to output (model 1) or even detrimental
e¤ects of collateral constraints on the output reaction (model 3). The only
exception is the case where the wealth e¤ects of labor supply are ignored
(model 2). Next, we set the e¢ ciency in the debt market to be equal to
that reported for the US. All versions of the model display a signicant am-
plication of the shock to output. Model 1 reports an amplication of 33
percent, and model 3, about 30 percent; an exceptionally high amplication
is generated by model 2. Similar results are obtained if we use the average
degree of ine¢ ciency reported for groups of OECD economies di¤ering in
terms of legal origins. Setting  equal to these averages implies a reaction of
output between 15 and 48 percent higher than that obtained in the repre-
sentative agent model. Thus, if realistic values of the degree of credit market
ine¢ ciency are assumed ( < 1 ), the role of collateral constraints in terms
of the amplication of productivity shocks is signicantly enhanced, even
under standard assumptions on the utility function and production process.
6 Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to quantify the amplication generated by collat-
eral constraints in relation to the degree of frictions in the credit market.
To this end, we analyze a stylized business cycle version of the Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997) model. We document that the existence of costly debt
enforcement procedures which has been captured by calibrating the degree
10According to Djankov et al. (2006), the degree of e¢ ciency in the debt enforcement
procedures around the world does not reach such a high level.
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of debt enforcement e¢ ciency in the model as in the data generates signif-
icant amplication of productivity shocks to output. Previous literature by
ignoring potential ine¢ ciencies in debt enforcement procedures, neglects an
important source of amplication for this class of models and thus minimizes
the role of collateral constraints as an endogenous amplication mechanism.
16
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Appendix .1 Benchmark Model: Equilibrium Conditions
The system of non-linear equations is given by four rst order conditions:
Uc1;t
Rt
= 1EtUc1;t+1 ; (E.1)
Uc2;t
Rt
  2;t = 2EtUc2;t+1 ; (E.2)
qt   1Et
Uc1;t+1
Uc1;t
qt+1 = 1Et
Uc1;t+1
Uc1;t
Fk1;t+1; (E.3)
qt   2Et
Uc2;t+1
Uc2;t
qt+1 = 2Et
Uc2;t+1
Uc2;t
Fk2;t+1 + Etqt+1
2t
Uc2;t
; (E.4)
our aggregate conditions:
n1k1t + n2k2t = K1t +K2t = 1; (E.5)
yt = n1y1t + n2y2t; (E.6)
n1b1t + n2b2t = 0; (E.7)
one budget constraint:11
c2t + qt(k2t   k2t 1) = y2t + b2t
Rt
  b2t 1; (E.8)
one borrowing constraint:
b2;t = Et [qt+1k2t] ; (E.9)
the resource constraint:
yt = n1c1t + n2c2t; (E.10)
the two technologies:
y1t = Ztk

1t 1; y2t = Ztk2t 1: (E.11)
This gives twelve equations for twelve unknowns:f2t; qt; Rt; ytg and fcit; kit; bit; yitg1t=0
for i=1,2.
Appendix .2 Benchmark Model: Steady State
From E.1 we nd the steady state interest rate:
1
R
= 1: (ss.1)
From E.2, the lagrange multiplier:
2 = (1   2)uc2 : (ss.2)
11Using WalrasLaw, we can drop at each t one of the two budget constraints.
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Using E.3 and E.4:
q =
1
1  1
Fk1 =
2
1  2   (1   2)
Fk2 : (ss.3)
Substituting for K1 using the aggregate condition on capital: K1 = 1 K2;
we nd the steady state allocation of capital to the group of borrowers, K2:
1
1  1

1 K2
n1
 1
=
2
1  2   (1   2)

K2
n2
 1
:
Thus:
K2 =
1
1 + n1n2
h
2(1 1)
1[1 2 (1 2)]
i 1
 1
 :
Thus we nd the steady state borrowing level,
b2 =  [qk2] =  b1; (ss.4)
and total production,
y = n1y1 + n2y2; (ss.5)
where
y1 = k

1 ; y2 = k

2 :
From E.8 we nd the consumption of the borrowers,
c2 = y2   b2

1  1
R

;
and, from the resource constraint the consumption of the group of lenders,
n1c1 = y   n2c2: (ss.8)
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Table 1: Debt Enforcement around the World
Around the World OECD
income level e¢ ciency legal origins e¢ ciency
high 77.35 english 77.0
upper middle 46.11 french 69.7
lower middle 35.03 german 72.2
Total 51.97 nordic 84.9
Source: Djankov,Hart, McLiesh and Shleifer (2006)
Table 2: Benchmark Parameter Values
preferences shock process
discount rate 1 = 0:99 autocorrelation z = 0:9
2 = 0:95
 = 2:2 population n = 0:5
technology  = 0:4 borrowing limit  = 1
Table 3.a: Model Results
e¢ ciency output amplication
 = 85:8 2 = 0:91 2 = 0:95 2 = 0:97
 = 0:4 0.3046 0.2437 0.1716
 = 0:7 0.3033 0.3506 0.3070
 = 1
 = 0:4 0.0523 0.0263 0.0132
 = 0:7 0.1889 0.1018 0.0529
Other parameters set as in table 2.
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Table 3.b: Model Results
e¢ ciency output amplication
model 1 model 2 model 3
representative agent model 0 0.54 0
 = 1 100 0.0645 0.8196 -0.0834
US 85.8 0.3046 1.0584 0.2167
OECD, e¢ ciency by legal origins
english 77.0 0.2504 0.8348 0.1827
french 69.7 0.2027 0.7192 0.1461
german 72.2 0.2186 0.7525 0.1584
nordic 84.9 0.2980 1.0201 0.2141
model 1: no labor supply
model 2: household labor, utility eq. (9)
model 3: household labor, utility eq. (13)
Other parameters set as in table 2.
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Figure 1.a shows how marginal productivity of capital for borrowers and lenders varies with 
respect to the capital holding and γ. 
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Figure 1.b shows how the steady state values of the model's variables change with respect 
to the degree of credit market inefficiency, γ. 
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 Figure 1.c shows how the steady state productivity gap and borrowers share of production 
varies with respect to γ. 
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Figure 2.a shows the responses to a 1% decrease in productivity. The units on the vertical 
axes  are percentage deviations from the steady state, while on the horizontal axes are 
years. 
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Figure 2.b shows the response of total aggregate output to a 1% decrease in productivity 
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Figure 3.a second period amplification of the shock on production— endogenous reaction to 
shocks 
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Figure 3.b second period amplification of the shock on production— endogenous reaction to 
shocks 
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Figure 3.c second period amplification of the shock on production— endogenous reaction to 
shocks 
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Figure 3.d second period amplification of the shock on production— endogenous reaction to 
shocks 
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Figure 4.  second period amplification of the shock on production— endogenous reaction to 
shocks 
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Figure 5.a second period amplification of the shock on production— endogenous reaction to 
shocks 
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Figure 5.b second period amplification of the shock on production— endogenous reaction to 
shocks 
